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1 Introduction
Since the CubeSat standard was introduced in 1999 [1], 
over 400 CubeSats have been launched by the end of 2015. 
A CubeSat is a satellite with standardized mechanical inter-
faces for a launch interface adaptor and comprises one or 
more units of 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm. There have been 
several global surveys on CubeSats in the past looking at 
their mission characteristics, implemented technologies 
and overall success rates [2, 3]. A recent study shows that 
about 40 % of the launched CubeSats were not success-
ful and provides some qualitative analysis on the failure 
causes with an emphasis on the development process [3]. 
It concludes with the recommendations to improve under-
standing of the failure sources and study technological 
capabilities to look for trends and prediction. The objective 
of this paper is to provide the results from a survey on the 
implementation and reliability of CubeSat data and power 
interfaces.
1.1  Motivation for the survey
Standardization of interfaces has been one of the key pillars 
of the increasing popularity of CubeSats in terms of mis-
sions [3] and commercially available subsystems. A stand-
ard for electrical interfaces allows for easy integration of 
subsystems from different suppliers. The CubeSat speci-
fication limits itself to external dimensions and interfaces 
with the launch adapter [4]. There is formally no standard 
specification for CubeSat electrical bus interfaces. How-
ever, the wiring harness of the PC/104 embedded systems 
standard [5] has been adopted in many CubeSats missions 
and commercially available CubeSat subsystems. Those 
using the PC/104 standard also widely implement the I2C 
data bus for communication between subsystems. The 
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PC/104 standard in combination with the I2C data bus is 
currently being associated with the CubeSat standard. 
However, it was already discovered in an earlier study that 
this de-facto standard has been applied in a rather incon-
sistent manner leading to potential compatibility issues 
when integrating several commercially available subsys-
tems [6]. Next to this compatibility issue, many issues 
with the I2C data bus interface were found throughout the 
development and operations of Delfi-C3 and Delfi-n3Xt [7], 
two successful satellites of TU Delft’s CubeSat program. A 
more extensive survey and investigation into the electrical 
bus interfaces is considered to be a good starting point for 
further investigation into reliability aspects of CubeSats, 
as such interfaces introduce requirements and constraints 
to all subsystems. Second, this survey is intended as a first 
step in a thorough analysis which can be used as input for 
the design of future CubeSats as well as the development 
of a new potential CubeSat standard which is reliable and 
fulfils the needs of future generations of CubeSats.
1.2  Survey approach
First, a literature survey has been performed. In the major-
ity of the publications on flight results, however, specific 
issues are not provided and/or discussed in detail. There-
fore, the survey was complemented with an extensive 
questionnaire sent to the global CubeSat community. This 
provides a statistical basis, while the literature survey sup-
ports and substantiates some of the findings. Further litera-
ture study is subsequently used to analyse the results and to 
draw conclusions.
1.3  Conclusions from other satellite surveys
The reliability of launched satellites has been investigated 
by several researchers worldwide. According to a study of 
129 satellites of all classes [8], at least 45 % of all satel-
lite failures can be allocated to electrical faults. The elec-
trical power subsystem (EPS) is accountable for 27 % 
and Command and Data Handling (CDH) for 15 % of the 
failures encountered, which together have a major impact 
on reliability. Looking more closely to the electrical inter-
faces, only 5 % of the failures are allocated to the power 
bus and there is no specific mention of failures allocated 
to the data bus. Another study [9] focused on the EPS spe-
cifically using data of over a thousand spacecraft launched 
between 1990 and 2008. For Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satel-
lites, which are the orbital regime of the vast majority of 
CubeSats, 29 % of the failures on the electrical power sub-
system are allocated to the electrical distribution. Of these 
failures, 80 % is a fatal failure. The overall average failure 
rate of the EPS is, however, just 3.8 % for LEO satellites. 
These two studies do not confirm the substantial relevance 
of the electrical interfaces on the reliability of satellites, in 
general.
There has been a study on small satellite reliability 
which analyses the anomalies of subsystems of 222 satel-
lites up to 500 kg [10]. This study provided reliability over 
operational lifetime. One of the conclusions is that satellites 
below 10 kg show a relatively high infant mortality rate and 
short lifetime compared with satellites between 10 kg and 
500 kg. Telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C), the 
Thermal Control System (TCS), and the mechanisms and 
structures (M&S) contribute most to infant mortality, while 
the EPS contributes to the largest amount of failures overall 
[10].
In a statistical study on the first 100 launched Cube-
Sats performed in 2013 [3], mission failures of CubeSats 
are analysed on a high level. One major conclusion is that 
a third of all failed missions were never contacted after 
launch. Another 27 % of the failures can be attributed to 
a configuration or interface failure between communication 
hardware and 14 % to the EPS [3]. This study does not spe-
cifically address the electrical interfaces.
From all past satellite surveys, it can be concluded that 
electrical interfaces have not been identified as a significant 
contributor to mission failures. However, as CubeSats are 
just a small and relatively recent subset of the small satel-
lite surveys [8–10] and the CubeSat survey [3] only shows 
reliability figures on a high system level, initial concerns 
stated in Sect. 1.1 cannot be relieved without further study.
2  General survey statistics
First, the questionnaire is introduced in Sect. 2.1. Sec-
tion 2.2 provides overall CubeSat reliability results used 
to investigate the relevance of the electrical interfaces in 
particular.
2.1  Questionnaire response and processing
On the 4th of November 2014, a questionnaire has 
been sent out to in total 987 personal and general email-
addresses affiliated with all of the launched CubeSats and 
many CubeSats in development at that time. It has been 
decided and communicated that the results of the question-
naire are treated anonymously, as full public disclosure 
might otherwise prohibit or discourage participation for 
some. The questionnaire consisted roughly of three sections 
with a total of 33 questions. The first section addresses 
the general reliability aspects of the represented CubeSat, 
the second section addresses the reliability aspects of the 
bus interfaces of the same CubeSat, and the third section 
addresses the expert insight of overall failure rates and 
causes for CubeSats, in general. This paper focuses on the 
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second section and uses part of the answers of the first sec-
tion to provide a general context. Many questions have pre-
defined multiple choice/selection answers as well as open 
boxes for alternatives and/or clarifications. Care is taken to 
avoid that the pre-defined options would bias the outcome 
and this has been verified by a small test panel which is not 
directly involved in this study. The questionnaire closed on 
the 1st of January 2015.
There were in total 138 participants of which 113 have 
fully completed the questionnaire. For 13 missions, there 
were multiple participants per CubeSat. In this case, the 
CubeSat-related answers are analysed and merged to a 
single answer. Wherever required, voting (for multiple 
choice questions with at least three participants), averaging 
(for numeric questions), or analysis (using publicly avail-
able information) have been applied to merge the answers. 
Following this process, there are answers on 60 launched 
CubeSats and 44 which are in the development or await-
ing launch. In some cases, contradicting answers could not 
be merged into a single unbiased answer and those answers 
are excluded from further analysis. For some questions, the 
answers are unclear or skipped by the participant. In this 
paper, the total number of CubeSats which have been ana-
lysed for each question is provided with ‘n’.
The participation on 60 launched CubeSats is 24 % of 
the total CubeSats deployed into orbit up to end 2014 and 
29 % if the 48 Flock CubeSats from Planet Labs deployed 
into orbit in 2014 are only counted as one satellite. In 
Fig. 1, the participation distributed over time is provided 
and can be compared with the totals that are successfully 
deployed into orbit each year. The coefficient of determina-
tion for this aspect is calculated to be R2 = 0.76 (R2 = 1 
would yield a perfect sample distribution). However, with 
the 2014 Flock satellites only counted once, R2 = 0.93. 
Likewise, for the organizational type (educational, civil, 
military, and commercial), R2 = 0.59.
2.2  General CubeSat reliability
The participants have been requested to categorize their 
CubeSat mission objectives and provide success rates for 
each category. Of the 60 launched CubeSats, the provided 
mission objective categories are education (n = 49), tech-
nology demonstration (n = 51), science (n = 27), com-
mercial (n = 3), civil (n = 4), military (n = 1), and radio 
amateur service (n = 2). For further investigation, science, 
commercial, civil, military, and radio amateur service 
objectives are grouped as ‘operational’ mission objectives 
(n = 32). The success rates are defined and ordered as 
unsuccessful, minor success, partial success, primary suc-
cess, and full success. The results are provided in Figs. 2 
and 3. They are split in the current status and the expected 
final status. In the current status, missions which are not 
completed are also included and the overall success rates 
can, therefore, be lower than what potentially can be 
achieved. The expected final status is the most likely result 
(as foreseen by the participant) taken the current status into 
account and the potential future achievements for ongoing 
missions. Many missions have multiple objectives in differ-
ent categories. The combination of education and technol-
ogy demonstration is very popular (n = 42), while there are 
20 missions with objectives in all three categories and only 
10 missions in a single category.
For the educational success, many teams consider the 
successful launch of their satellite and/or minimal opera-
tions as a success of the educational objective. For technol-
ogy demonstration, a minimum functionality of the satel-
lite in orbit is required and it can be clearly seen that the 
Fig. 1  Survey response and 
total CubeSats successfully 
deployed into orbit, distributed 
over launch years
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success rates are lower for this objective compared with 
education. The demonstrated systems might, however, still 
not have to work completely according to specifications. 
For operational missions instead, the satellite really needs 
to work according to specifications to have a full success. 
For these most demanding objectives, the success rates are 
even further down and a vast majority of those CubeSat 
missions do not fulfill this objective completely. Only for 
28 % of all missions (n = 60), all objectives have been met 
so far. The expectation, as answered by the participants, is 
that 35 % will eventually achieve full success.
The root cause allocation to subsystems for not meeting 
one or more of the mission objectives with full success is 
investigated and its results are provided in Fig. 4. The point 
of reference is the expected final success rates from Fig. 3 
and includes fully determined root causes as well as the 
main hypothesis.
The electrical bus interfaces, which are the main topic 
of this study, are typically functionally allocated to the 
EPS and CDHS. Only for a single case, a hypothesis is 
provided that the data bus has been the root cause of not 
meeting one of the mission objectives. The EPS problems 
are allocated to batteries, solar cell degradation, and elec-
tronic malfunctions at the central EPS. There is no hard 
evidence that electrical interfaces have contributed to the 
mission failures of past and ongoing missions. It should, 
however, be noted that catastrophic failures on the criti-
cal electrical interfaces may lead to a sudden loss of sat-
ellite operation, which complicates root cause analysis. In 
addition, operational failures may have occurred after the 
mission design lifetime. Issues on the electrical interfaces 
which are non-catastrophic may still complicate operations 
and/or degrade the potential mission return. The potential 
correlation with catastrophic failures and other issues and 
electrical bus interfaces is investigated further in the fol-
lowing sections.
The mission design lifetime for the launched CubeSats 
(n = 59) is up to 6 months for 41 %, between 8 months and 
a year for 42 % and the remaining 17 % more than 1 year. 
The average mission design lifetime is 11 months with a 
standard deviation of 9 months, a minimum of 1 month, 
and a maximum of 5 years.
Fig. 2  Current success rates of launched CubeSats for education (left, n = 49), technology demonstration (middle, n = 51), and operational mis-
sion (right, n = 32) objectives
Fig. 3  Expected final success rates for launched CubeSats for education (left, n = 49), technology demonstration (middle, n = 51), and opera-
tional mission (right, n = 32) objectives
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Figure 5 provides the operational status after a selected 
set of months since launch. The total percentage gradu-
ally drops with lifetime, as not all CubeSats have been in 
orbit for so long. Of the 14 CubeSats (23 % of total) which 
have lost contact within 3 years, 12 CubeSats (20 % of 
total) have not been operational for their entire mission 
design lifetime. This partially explains why so many tech-
nical mission objectives have not been fully successful. The 
maximum reported fully operational status (including com-
manding capability) is 10 years and the average so far is 
1.2 years.
3  Survey on CubeSat data buses
In Sect. 3.1, the data buses implemented are discussed. The 
data bus reliability is discussed in Sects. 3.2.
3.1  Data Bus Implementation
In Fig. 6, the types of data interfaces that are implemented 
in the CubeSats between the main subsystems and/or main 
components are shown. The data buses are analysed only 
on the physical layer, which is layer 1 of the Open Sys-
tems Interconnection (OSI) model [11]. Local interfaces on 
a printed circuit board, for instance between a microcon-
troller and its peripherals, are not analysed. Multiple dif-
ferent data buses can be implemented on a single CubeSat: 
22 % have two, 29 % three, and 4 % four (n = 82).
The most frequently employed bus is the Inter Inte-
grated Circuit (I2C) bus. This is explained by the fact that 
many COTS integrated circuits have an internal I2C con-
troller and it is implemented in the majority of the COTS 
CubeSat subsystems. I2C is a two-wire serial interface 
which connects two or more nodes in a master(s)-slave(s) 
Fig. 4  Root cause allocation for not achieving full success for education (left, n = 7), technology demonstration (middle, n = 24), and opera-
tional mission (right, n = 19) objectives
Fig. 5  Operational status of 
CubeSat missions after speci-
fied period since launch as of 
November 2014 (n = 60)
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configuration with typical data rates of 100 kbit/s for the 
standard mode and 400 kbit/s for a fast mode [12]. Practi-
cal experience has shown that a minimum clock frequency 
of 10 times the baud rate is needed for reliable operation 
within microcontrollers [7]. The maximum bus length 
depends on capacity, shielding, and additional buffering 
[12], but the protocol is designed for short distances and, 
in practical cases, is limited to several tens of centimeters 
(many nodes using stacked connectors) up to several meters 
(few nodes, good wiring conditions).
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) is also widely imple-
mented in CubeSats. SPI is a four-wire full duplex serial 
interface which connects one master with one slave at a 
time [13]. One line is a slave select, which can be multi-
plied from the master to connect multiple slaves, and is a 
form of physical addressing. The data rates are not bound 
by modes and can be several orders higher than for I2C. 
However, the slave needs to handle the throughput of the 
master without the ability to stretch the clock as with I2C, 
otherwise the data can be lost. Similar to I2C, this bus is 
designed for short distances up to several meters in the 
favourable conditions.
Recommended Standard 232 (RS-232) scores about 
equal to SPI in implementation rate. RS-232 is a serial data 
interface between digital systems and is full duplex [14]. It 
cannot be connected or expanded to more than two nodes. 
Its raw data rates (including protocol overhead) are up to 
20 kbit/s according to the standard. However, in current 
practice, non-standard 3-wire and 5-wire implementations 
up to 115.2 kbit/s are used. The standard is designed for 
distances up to 15 m [14].
The controller area network (CAN) bus has been imple-
mented only in a few launched CubeSats, but is becoming 
more popular. CAN bus is developed for automotive appli-
cations and is designed to be able to operate in harsh envi-
ronments. It is a serial bus with differential signalling and 
failure tolerance at OSI layer 1 is possible for this bus. Data 
rates are up to 1 Mbit/s. Cable connections can span a dis-
tance up to 40 m.
Universal serial bus (USB) shows a similar trend as the 
CAN bus. USB is the currently most popular standard to 
connect computers with peripheral equipment. It has sev-
eral backwards compatible modes with the current fastest 
being SuperSpeed + (USB 3.1) which supports 10 Gbit/s 
of data rate [15] over 8 wires (full duplex). USB can only 
be used to connect one master to one slave, which can be 
extended using a hub.
Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) 
is no exclusive data bus, but a piece of (integrated) hard-
ware to manage the link between a microprocessor and a 
serial data bus and includes RS-232 and RS-422. Space-
Wire is the only data bus designed for space applications. 
It is, however, only implemented in one CubeSat which is 
still to be launched. In addition, wireless standards are not 
widely implemented yet.
3.2  Data bus reliability
The questionnaire addressed the reliability of the imple-
mented data buses. To exclude immature designs and to 
have sufficient statistical input, only I2C, SPI, and RS-232 
for launched CubeSats are analysed in this section. The 
results for the implemented failure tolerance features at 
OSI layer 1 [11] for each bus is presented in Fig. 7. Except 
for the optional error line for I2C, the three buses do not 
have inherent failure tolerance at OSI layer 1. This means 
that most failure tolerance features presented in Fig. 7 are 
designed and implemented by the CubeSat developers. Sin-
gle-wire failure tolerance means that the bus is still opera-
tional if there is a fault on one line. This can lead to main-
tained performance (e.g., in case of full redundancy) or to 
degraded performance (e.g., going from differential signal-
ling to single-ended signalling by lowering the maximum 
data rate).
Fig. 6  Implemented data buses 
in CubeSats
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It can be clearly seen from Fig. 7 that the majority of 
CubeSats have additional failure tolerance features imple-
mented for the three different buses. Very popular are bus 
lockup protection and supplementary watchdog circuitry 
(these features may be overlapping). For SPI, there are 
also many failure tolerance features implemented, although 
significantly less than for I2C. For both buses, however, in 
about 30 % of the cases, there is not just a single serial bus 
connector to all subsystems. Instead, there are separated 
buses connected to (groups of) subsystems of the same bus 
type. Redundant wiring and buses are not implemented 
widely, potentially due to limited availability of microcon-
trollers and peripheral devices with dual I2C or SPI con-
troller and the complexity of such solutions. The RS-232 
interface has the least amount of failure tolerance features 
implemented, but this bus standard can only connect two 
nodes, and for 87 % (n = 24) of the CubeSats, this is com-
plemented with one or more of the other bus types.
Figure 8 presents the reported in-orbit issues for I2C, 
SPI, and RS-232. For I2C, bus lockups appear to be a major 
issue. Also for one CubeSat, I2C has led to a catastrophic 
failure (proven), while for two more I2C are a likely cause 
(hypothesis). For RS-232 and SPI, only few issues are 
reported. There are several possible explanations why I2C 
has a relatively high amount of reported issues:
• I2C lacks separate lines for handshaking and control 
compared with SPI and RS-232.
• For I2C, typically a higher amount of nodes is connected 
to the same bus than for SPI and RS-232.
• I2C does not have differential signalling and is imple-
mented without shielding in most CubeSats.
Fig. 7  Implementation of fail-
ure tolerance features in Cube-
Sats for different data buses
Fig. 8  In-orbit issues reported 
for three bus standards
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• The state-machine of I2C hardware controller and firm-
ware may have errors. This risk becomes larger when 
different microcontrollers are connected to the same 
bus.
Some examples of I2C problems are found in literature. 
The failure of the CP4 CubeSat of California Polytech-
nic State University is most likely the result of I2C data 
bus problems [16]. The Delfi-C3 satellite of TU Delft also 
experienced major I2C problems, which caused high bit-
error-rates as well as sustained bus lockups [7]. These bus 
lockups were recovered by the power reset in each eclipse, 
because of the absence of a battery in this satellite. The 
Delfi-n3Xt satellite of TU Delft lost its transmission signal 
after completion of its primary mission objectives when an 
experimental transponder was switched on [17]. The main 
hypothesis for the root cause is that an I2C buffer has been 
blown up by the transponder, effectively terminating all 
internal data handling. During a late development stage, it 
was already discovered that the implemented I2C buffer has 
a potential failure mode which shorts the bus to ground.
4  Survey on CubeSat power buses
4.1  Electrical power subsystems implemented
A central electrical power subsystem (EPS) unit is typically 
responsible for the power conversion from the solar panels, 
the energy storage, as well as the distribution of power to 
the rest of the satellite over one or more power bus lines. 
The ability to switch subsystems on and off, overcurrent 
protection, and the power bus topology have an impact on 
the power bus reliability. A former study has shown that 
each commercial supplier has a different implementation 
on these aspects [6].
Of the combined launched and to be launched Cube-
Sats (n = 84), 63 % have a custom designed central EPS 
unit, 19 % a COTS unit from GOMSpace, 15 % from 
ClydeSpace, 1 % from CubeSat Kit, and 1 % from Tyvak.
In Fig. 9, the topology and reliability features imple-
mented on the CubeSats are provided. A shared line means 
that multiple subsystems are drawing current from a single 
power line. If this line is only protected at the central EPS 
unit, the subsystems allocated to this shared line pose a 
threat to each other. If they are, however, protected at the 
subsystems locally, this risk is mitigated. For individual 
lines to each subsystem, protection could be at the central 
unit and/or the local subsystem. As example for such power 
protection, in the MicroMAS CubeSat of MIT, Fairchild 
FPF2700 high-side current limit switches are implemented 
to provide load switching and overcurrent protection [18]. 
Another example is the protection circuit within Delfi-n3Xt 
which uses a dedicated circuit at each subsystem locally to 
protect both the main power bus as well as the I2C data bus 
[19].
4.2  Power distribution reliability
A 29 % of the launched CubeSats (n = 49) have reported 
in-orbit issues with the EPS. The issues are categorized 
and provided in Fig. 10. The rapid solar cell degradation is 
noteworthy, as two reported, this was due to missing cover 
glasses, while the third was not specified.
For fully unprotected distribution lines, there is a risk to 
the overall EPS. A 10 % of the CubeSats (n = 50) have 
implemented unprotected shared distribution lines. One of 
them lost contact after 10 days, with a hypothesis of a radi-
ation event resulting in a short circuit. A second CubeSat 
out of this five never made contact, for which the reason is 
Fig. 9  Distribution topology 
and reliability features
Fig. 10  In-orbit issues reported for the EPS (n = 49)
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unknown. Despite small sample size, these two examples 
exhibit the risk of implementing unprotected power distri-
bution lines.
Several papers address the relation of power distri-
bution protection features and radiation effects. It was 
reported that Cute-1.7 + APD have lost operability of 
their satellite about 3 weeks after launch, most likely due 
to radiation effects [20]. On ground, analysis revealed that 
a combination of a latch-up and a too high threshold for 
an overcurrent protection circuit have caused damage to 
the on-board integrated circuits [20]. The GOMX-1 sat-
ellite reported (intentional) power cycles of their payload 
triggered by bit-flips in the field-programmable gate array 
(FPGA) due to radiation effects, many of them occurring 
in high-energy electron regions, such as the South Atlantic 
Anomaly [21]. However, for GeneSat-1 analysis of in-orbit 
data of the performance of Peripheral Interface Controllers 
(PICs) indicated no CPU resets, latch-ups or single-event 
upsets during its 18 months of operation [22]. It can thus 
be concluded that susceptibility to radiation effects may be 
strongly related to the specific type of integrated circuits 
implemented.
5  Survey on CubeSat wiring harness
The connector of the PC/104 bus standard has become 
the de-facto standard wiring harness in CubeSats, as most 
commercial developers provide their subsystems with this 
interface. The PC/104 bus standard is derived from the ISA 
bus applied in personal computers in the past, and its initial 
release was 1992 [5]. It defines not only the wiring harness, 
but also the form factor of the printed circuit boards and 
their mechanical mounting [5] and is supposed to be able 
to stack embedded systems on top of each other. In Fig. 11, 
an example is provided showing the 104-pin stackable 
connector.
For CubeSats, many aspects of the PC/104 standard are 
not implemented. The commercial suppliers of CubeSat 
subsystem typically implement the I2C data bus, while the 
Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus is the intended 
data bus for the PC/104 standard [5]. In addition, the allo-
cation and distribution topology for power are not taken 
over, nor standardized for CubeSats, leading to compat-
ibility issues [6]. Therefore, when PC/104 is mentioned as 
standard in relation to CubeSats, this refers to a fixed phys-
ical wiring harness and the mechanical layout and not the 
data bus or pin allocation.
For all CubeSats, the specification or standard of wir-
ing harness was asked for. These are grouped in ‘PC/104’ 
and ‘other’, as no other standard is clearly implemented 
by multiple developers. For the launched CubeSats, 35 % 
have implemented the PC/104 connector (n = 49). For the 
CubeSats not yet launched, this is 59 % (n = 32), probably 
due to the increasing availability of commercial subsystems 
with a PC/104 connector. For CubeSats with different wir-
ing harness, the information provided is too limited and 
heterogeneous for statistical analysis.
Of the launched CubeSats, there are no in-orbit failures 
reported which are directly allocated to the wiring harness 
in the sense of wiring breaks or short circuits. The stand-
ard itself, however, partially drives power bus distribution 
and data bus selection, which is already treated in the previ-
ous sections. In Fig. 12, the design issues for all CubeSats 
(launched and to be launched) with the PC/104 connector 
are provided based on simple ‘yes or no’ questions. The 
wires are extended through-hole pins which can be stacked 
into the next connector. In some cases, an additional con-
nector is stacked in between two printed circuit boards to 
be able to span a wider distance.
Fig. 11  Example of a CubeSat on-board computer (TU Delft) with 
PC/104 connector
Fig. 12  Design issues reported on PC/104 connector (n = 36)
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It can concluded from Fig. 12 that a (small) majority 
states that the PC/104 connector is too big, while only a 
small minority considers the amount of pins to be too little. 
Thus, for a future standard, a smaller connector with fewer 
pins is recommended. The reliability of the connectors 
or wiring is not a major concern. Three additional issues 
(‘other’ in Fig. 12) are reported: I2C cannot handle long 
wiring, there are difficulties with mating/de-mating during 
the development phase and PC/104 structural layout does 
not create good thermal paths.
From literature, a few additional observations are made. 
According to Kimm and Jarell [23], the PC/104 CubeSat 
Kit from Pumpkin shows two weaknesses: the non-redun-
dant architecture of the on-board processor and the fairly 
large size of the physical bus interface. It is also noted that 
the form factor makes it difficult to include redundant sys-
tems. They suggest to use CAN for a data bus in CubeSats 
and propose a protocol (at higher OSI layers) to handle 
data traffic. During the development of the EDSN satel-
lite, it was found that low-cost consumer grade connectors 
sometimes provided physical alignment issues and even 
intermittent contacts [24]. It is recommended to use higher 
grade components [24].
6  Conclusions and recommendations
In this paper, the implementation and reliability of electri-
cal bus interfaces are analysed through a literature survey 
and a questionnaire. In this section, the main results and 
conclusions are provided.
It has been found that at least 65 % of the CubeSats in 
this survey (n = 60) are expected not to fulfill all mission 
objectives. There is, however, no evidence that the electri-
cal interfaces are a major cause for this. The fully opera-
tional lifetime of CubeSats is 1.2 years on average, while 
20 % of the CubeSats have not been operational for their 
design life time.
Currently, the most popular buses for CubeSats are I2C, 
SPI, and RS-232. The I2C data bus shows many bus lock up 
issues on CubeSats (for three CubeSats, this bus is likely 
to have caused catastrophic damage, of which two beyond 
the mission design lifetime. Especially, the combination of 
unshielded pins of the PC/104 connector and the I2C data 
protocol is a concern.
While the EPS is a major source of in-orbit failures, 
most of those failures are not allocated to power bus 
interface. However, of the five CubeSats that have imple-
mented no protection of the power distribution lines, two 
have failed after some days in orbit. For the majority of the 
CubeSats which implemented the PC/104 connector, it is 
stated that the connector is too large, but no catastrophic in-
orbit failures have been reported, because of this connector.
For a future CubeSat bus standard, the following recom-
mendations can be made:
• The data bus should have a continuous nominal behav-
ior, without major risk for bus lockups.
• The power distribution lines should protect both the 
central EPS unit as well as the local subsystems against 
short circuits and overcurrent, including those induced 
by radiation effects.
• The standard interface connector should be smaller than 
the PC/104 connector.
• The standard interface should have a fixed pin allocation 
to achieve general compatibility between subsystems.
• The standard interface connector should tolerate the 
long-term thermo-mechanical stress cycles induced by 
the LEO alternation between Sun and eclipse, proven by 
representative (accelerated) life testing.
An important aspect for a future bus standard is the over-
all redundancy and failure mitigation concept for CubeSats. 
If there will be redundant physical subsystems, the bus 
standard may need to accommodate failure detection, iso-
lation, and recovery with specific wiring and/or circuitry. 
In addition, the data and power interfaces themselves may 
require redundancy. Further study into the needs and anal-
ysis on the impact of this aspect is recommended for the 
development of a new CubeSat bus interface standard. For 
improved analysis on this aspect and for CubeSats, in gen-
eral, it is recommended that CubeSat developers publish 
more details about their in-orbit results, with an emphasis 
on the experienced issues, anomalies, and failures.
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